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Abstract
Plato’s references to Empedocles in the myth of the Statesman perform a crucial role in 
the overarching political argument of the dialogue. Empedocles conceives of the cos-
mos as structured like a democracy, where the constituent powers ‘rule in turn’, sharing 
the offices of rulership equally via a cyclical exchange of power. In a complex act of 
philosophical appropriation, Plato takes up Empedocles’ cosmic cycles of rule in order 
to ‘correct’ them: instead of a democracy in which rule is shared cyclically amongst 
equal constituents, Plato’s cosmos undergoes cycles of the presence and absence 
of a single cosmic monarch who possesses ‘kingly epistēmē’. By means of a revision of 
Empedocles’ democratic cosmology, Plato’s richly woven myth is designed precisely to 
reject the appropriateness of democracy as a form of human political association and 
legitimate monarchy in its stead.
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Near the beginning of Plato’s Statesman, the Stranger relates to Young Socrates 
a wonderful and perplexing cosmological myth (268d-274e). The world, the 
Stranger contends, alternates perpetually between two cosmic ages: one is a 
Hesiodic ‘Golden Age’ of harmony, plenty, and divine protection; the other 
is their own degenerate age, in which the care of gods is absent and they 
are exposed to all the typical pains and struggles of human life. The myth is 
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complete with fantastic images of autochthonous human generation, aging in 
reverse, and a demiurgic ‘shepherd’ god who will return to save the world on 
the verge of its destruction. In a recent treatment of this passage by Charles 
Kahn, Kahn observes that the myth is remarkable not only for the richness 
of its images but also for the particular function it serves in the dialogue. 
While most Platonic myths function as a ‘postscript to the argument proper’, 
the Statesman myth (like the myth in the Phaedrus) is laid out towards the 
beginning of the dialogue and ‘seems to provide a premise for the following 
argument’.1 For Kahn, the myths of the Phaedrus and Statesman are ‘genuine’ 
myths because they both ‘require a certain suspension of disbelief, since the 
fantastic story they tell makes a doctrinal contribution to the theory that fol-
lows’.2 In other words, the myth of the two ages offers a specific kind of support 
for the political argument of the dialogue, one that is allusive and persuasive 
rather than strictly argumentative.
In this paper I explore how Plato’s engagement with the philosophy of 
Empedocles informs the function of the Statesman myth. Many commentators 
have noted that the myth comprises a richly woven fabric of elements drawn 
from and inspired by diverse traditions, including the Homeric, Hesiodic, and 
Presocratic philosophic traditions. Mitchell Miller has given insightful analysis 
of the way in which Plato comments on the Homeric trope of the ‘shepherd of 
the people’ and its development in the tradition of sophistic humanism.3 More 
recently, Helen van Noorden has given a thorough analysis of Plato’s integra-
tion of Hesiodic elements into the myth.4 Likewise, Joseph B. Skemp, Kahn, 
and van Noorden cite Empedocles’ cosmic cycles as a relevant precursor to 
the myth.5 The import of the Homeric and Hesiodic references in the myth 
has been treated quite extensively by Miller and van Noorden, respectively. 
However, despite the widely recognized reference to Empedocles in the myth, 
there has been no extended examination of the philosophical relevance of this 
reference to the dialogue as a whole. I argue that the Empedocles reference 
1   C. H. Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the Philosophy of Nature 
(Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 220. The logical terminology of ‘prem-
ise’ is perhaps a little misleading, especially in light of the complex relationship between 
muthos and logos as forms of discourse in Plato’s thought. My interpretation of the function 
of the myth in the dialogue comprises Section 3 of this article.
2   Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, p. 220.
3   M. H. Miller, The Philosopher in Plato’s Statesman (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1980), pp. 40-53.
4   H. van Noorden, Playing Hesiod: The ‘Myth of the Races’ in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 142-67.
5   J. B. Skemp, Plato’s Statesman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 90. Kahn, Plato and 
the Post-Socratic Dialogue, pp. 222, 224. Van Noorden, Playing Hesiod, pp. 152-3.
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develops a particular political theme in the dialogue. Plato’s political project in 
the Statesman is informed by the Greek philosophic tradition of considering 
human political relations to be grounded in the very structure of the cos-
mos (which itself can only be understood in the conceptual terms of human 
politics).6 I suggest that the myth of the two ages offers Plato’s take on this 
Presocratic trope. Empedocles could represent for Plato a paradigm of this 
tradition, for he portrays the cosmos as structured like a democracy. In the 
Statesman, Plato replaces Empedocles’ cosmic democracy with a cosmic sover-
eign monarchy. He does so by emphatically inverting Empedocles’ own model 
of alternating cycles of cosmic rule, replacing the cyclically shared rulership 
of Empedocles’ cosmology with cycles of the presence and absence of a sin-
gle cosmic monarch. Playing on the trope of a macro-micro level similarity 
between cosmos and polis, Plato rejects democracy and legitimates monarchic 
sovereignty in the human political sphere precisely by rejecting Empedocles’ 
cosmic democracy and establishing his own cosmic monarchy in its stead. The 
Empedoclean reference in the Statesman thus performs an integral function in 
the overarching political argument of the dialogue. I first show how Plato’s ref-
erence to Empedocles forms the basic structure of his own cosmological myth. 
Next I demonstrate how a careful reading of Empedocles’ fragments reveals 
his commitment to thinking of the cosmos as democratically structured, and 
I suggest that Plato read Empedocles’ cosmology as having a distinctly demo-
cratic resonance. Finally, I illustrate how Plato’s complex appropriation of 
Empedocles’ cosmic cycles undergirds the overarching political argument 
of the dialogue: by forcefully rejecting cosmic democracy in favor of cosmic 
monarchy, the Stranger is able to establish sovereign epistēmē as the touch-
stone in the search for the true statesman and thereby reject the legitimacy of 
non-monarchic forms of rule.
1 The Empedoclean Reference in the Myth
A discussion in the Sophist reveals that Empedocles is already on the radar for 
the Stranger prior to the transition to the Statesman. Following the famous 
‘parricide’ of Parmenides (241d-242b), the Stranger claims that previous 
6   This tradition can be traced back to the earliest extant fragments of Greek philosophy: e.g., in 
Anaximander’s fragment B1, where fundamental cosmic processes are understood through 
the normative concept of retributive justice. Cf. Vlastos’ illuminating treatment of this 
philosophic trope in G. Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies’, Classical 
Philology vol. 42, no. 3 (July, 1947), pp. 156-178. Cf. esp. Vlastos’ treatment of Anaximander at 
pp. 168-73. I discuss Vlastos’ analysis of Empedocles below.
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philosophers have discussed Being ‘carelessly’, for they never really specified 
‘just how many beings there are and what they’re like’ (242c).7 In the follow-
ing discussion of this philosophic tradition, the Stranger refers to ‘some Ionian 
and Sicilian muses’ (242d) (namely, Heraclitus and Empedocles, respectively) 
who tried to ‘weave together’ ontological monism and pluralism, claiming 
that ‘that which is is both many and one’ (242d-e). While the Stranger inter-
prets Heraclitus as holding the doctrine that Being is somehow ‘always’ (and 
therefore simultaneously) one and many,8 he interprets Empedocles as claim-
ing that Being alternates between states of oneness and manyness: ‘The softer 
ones [i.e., Empedocles and his students] relaxed this [claim] that these things 
always are this way; they say that the All, in turn (ἐν μέρει), is at one time 
(τοτὲ μέν) one and friendly under Aphrodite, and at another time (τοτὲ δέ) 
it is itself warlike with itself on account of some strife’ (242e-243a; my trans. 
Cp. 252b1-6). Here the Stranger refers to Empedocles’ cosmic model, in which 
Love and Strife (and concurrently, the different elements) rule in turn (ἐν μέρει 
κρατέουσι; cf. Empedocles DK B17 ll. 27-29, B26 ll. 1-2):9 at one time, one rules, 
at another time, another rules (τοτὲ μέν … τοτὲ δέ …; ἄλλοτε μέν … ἄλλοτε δέ …; 
cf. B17 ll. 1-2, B17 ll. 7-8, B26 ll. 5-6). It is precisely this model of cosmic cycles 
of rule that will form the foundation of the Stranger’s myth of the two ages in 
the Statesmen. Similarly to the Stranger’s ‘parricidal’ rejection of Parmenides’ 
ontology, however, Empedocles’ cosmic model will be taken up only to be 
altered fundamentally.
Turning now to the Statesman myth itself, we can begin by noting that many 
commentators have identified Empedocles as the primary inspiration for the 
cosmic cycles of the Statesman myth. In Skemp’s commentary, Skemp dis-
cusses a wide variety of possible sources for the myth, including Herodotean 
historical accounts of Egypt, Pythagorean doctrines, Eudemus’ theo-cosmog-
ony, Zoroastrian doctrines (including the cosmogonical myth of Oromazes and 
Areimanius found in Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris 47), and other Iranian influences 
7    All translations from the Sophist, except where noted, are from N. P. White’s transla-
tion in J. M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997).
8    Here the Stranger states (loosely paraphrasing Heraclitus DK B51): ‘for being taken apart, 
it [i.e., τὸ ὄν from 242e1] is always being brought together’ (διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ συμφέρεται; 
my trans.). I take it that the Stranger modifies the original aphorism to stress his interpreta-
tion that Heraclitus’ position maintains the simultaneous oneness and manyness of Being.
9    Unless otherwise noted, all line number references, Greek text, and translations from the 
fragments of Empedocles are from D. W. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: 
The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, vol. 1 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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introduced to the Greek world through Greco-Iranian syncretism.10 Ultimately, 
however, Skemp opts for Empedocles as the most relevant inspiration for the 
myth’s cosmic cycles.11 Kahn remarks that ‘the Empedoclean parallel deter-
mines the general form of the myth’: while the Statesman myth certainly draws 
from many diverse sources, ‘… the central, most original idea is Plato’s adapta-
tion of Empedoclean cosmic reversals to paint a picture of the age of Kronos 
in which the conditions of human life are radically reversed’.12 Van Noorden 
reiterates this observation in her treatment of the Hesiodic background of 
the myth. She notes that Empedocles’ cosmic cycles ‘provide positive inspi-
ration for the basic idea of the Elean [sic] Stranger’s story’ and suggests that 
interpreting the myth in light of its Empedoclean framework could solve some 
long-standing issues of interpretation for both cosmologies.13 Kahn emphasizes 
that these two cosmologies share the same fundamental structure of ‘a sym-
metrical movement back and forth between diametrically opposed situations’, 
which Plato signposts in the same way as Empedocles: τοτὲ μέν … τοτὲ δέ …14
But how exactly do we see this shared cosmological structure in the texts? 
In Empedocles, the cosmos alternates between a state of absolute dissolution in 
which the elements are all completely separated from one another and a state 
of absolute conglomeration in which the elements are completely and homo-
geneously combined.15 This cycle of alternation is due to the fact that the 
10   Skemp, Plato’s Statesman, pp. 85-103.
11   Skemp, Plato’s Statesman, pp. 94, 146 n. 1.
12   Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, pp. 222, 224, respectively.
13   Van Noorden, Playing Hesiod, p. 152. Namely, issues concerning the way in which both 
accounts interweave different (and potentially incompatible) kinds of discourse (e.g., in 
Plato, the rational-theological discourse of the ‘god’ and ‘demiurge’ versus the mythic dis-
course of ‘Kronos’ and ‘Zeus’; in Empedocles, the physicalistic discourse of elements and 
their mixture versus the daemonic mythic discourse). Cf. Van Noorden, Playing Hesiod, 
152-3 and the literature cited in her footnotes.
14   Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, p. 222. For Plato’s signposting of the cosmic 
cycles with τοτὲ μέν … τοτὲ δέ … Kahn cites 269c4-5 and 270a3-5 (and compares again 
Sophist 242e5-243a1) to which we may add 270b7-8, as well as the near match 274d8 (νῦν 
μέν … τοτὲ δέ …).
15   Precise descriptions of Empedocles’ cosmic cycle are not found in the fragments and 
reconstruction of its details is difficult. There is much debate in the literature con-
cerning even the basic features of the cosmic cycle. My characterization follows the 
interpretations of Graham, Inwood, O’Brien, and Wright: Graham, The Texts of Early 
Greek Philosophy, p. 426; B. Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation 
with Introduction by Brad Inwood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), pp. 40-52; 
D. O’Brien, ‘Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle’, The Classical Quarterly 17, no. 1 (May, 1967), 
pp. 29-40; M. R. Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981), pp. 164-74, 181-229. For the cosmic cycles generally, cf. B17, B26. For the state 
of homogeneous combination, cf. B27, B27a, B28, B29 and Wright ad loc. For evidence of 
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deities of Love and Strife ‘rule in turn’ (B17 ln. 29, B26 ln. 1). When Strife rules 
the cosmos, there is a period of continually increasing disintegration until the 
cosmos reaches the condition of absolute dissolution. At this point Love takes 
over, and there is a period of continually increasing integration (B35, B36) until 
the condition of absolute conglomeration is reached, after which rule is again 
passed to Strife, and the cycle repeats. The phenomenal world of our expe-
rience is situated in one of the interim periods between these two extreme 
poles (cf. B21, B23, B26, B35).16 In Plato’s myth, the cosmos undergoes a similar 
alternating cycle between the Age of Kronos and the Age of Zeus. During the 
Age of Kronos, the cosmos’ rotation is guided by the demiurge (269c). This 
is a Hesiodic ‘Golden Age’ of profound harmony between humans, animals, 
and divinities during which the gods themselves care for all living creatures, 
the earth generates nourishment for us ‘spontaneously’ (αὐτομάτη), and there 
are no politeiai or traditional family structures (271c-272b). During this time 
living beings age in reverse; they sprout from the earth fully grown, then 
become younger and younger until they finally disappear (270d-271c). After an 
appointed amount of time autochthonous generation is spent (for ‘each soul 
had given up all her generations, having fallen into the ground as seed as many 
times as had been ordained for each’) (272e),17 at which point the demiurge 
immediately lets go of the ‘rudder’ of the cosmos and he and the lesser divini-
ties withdraw (272d-e). Now we enter the Age of Zeus, in which the cosmos, 
led by its own ‘destiny and inborn desire’ (272e), reverses directions and takes 
over its own ‘care and rule’ (ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κράτος) (273a). At first it remembers 
the ‘teaching’ of the demiurge and proceeds in an orderly fashion, but over 
time it slowly forgets these teachings, becoming more and more disordered 
and producing ‘everything under the heavens that turns out to be harsh and 
unjust’ (273a-c). Finally, when the cosmos has become so disordered that it 
is on the brink of complete destruction, the demiurge once again ‘takes his 
seat at the helm’ and restores order, bringing the cosmos back into the har-
monious Age of Kronos, and once again ‘fashions it into something immortal 
and ageless’ (273d-e). In both authors’ cosmologies we see a cosmos cyclically 
the state of complete separation, we rely on Plutarch’s The Face of the Moon 926d-927a 
and extrapolation from texts of Aristotle and Simplicius; cf. O’Brien’s sensitive treatment 
of the evidence (O’Brien, ‘Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle’) as well as Inwood, The Poem of 
Empedocles, p. 49; Wright, Empedocles, pp. 185-6.
16   Cf. esp. Wright’s discussion of B26: Wright, Empedocles, pp. 181-2.
17   Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Statesman are from E. T. H. Brann, 
P. Kalkavage, and E. Salem, Plato Statesman: Translation, Introduction, Glossary, and Essay 
(Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2012).
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alternating between two opposed eras, one characterized broadly by harmony 
and friendship, the other characterized by disharmony and strife.
The Empedoclean allusions go deeper than this basic structural similarity, 
however. In a way analogous to Empedocles’ era of increasing dissolution, the 
Age of Zeus is one in which the cosmos, gradually ‘forgetting’ the teachings 
of the demiurge on account of its inherent ‘bodily aspect’ (τὸ σωματοειδές), 
increasingly descends into ‘disharmony’ (ἀναρμοστία), where a pre-cosmic 
state of disorder progressively ‘holds power’ (δυναστεύει) (273a-d). Before the 
cosmos can reach a state analogous to Empedocles’ condition of absolute disso-
lution, however, (i.e., before it can ‘plunge into the boundless sea of unlikeness 
[ἀνομοιότης]’; 273d-e) the demiurge once again puts his hand on the rudder 
of the cosmos and reverses its rotation. While the Age of Kronos is presented 
by the Stranger as an era characterized by an unchanging condition of care and 
attention from the god rather than as a period of increasing integration, this 
age also shares some interesting similarities to Empedocles’ era of Love. Both 
van Noorden and Kahn note that the harmony between animals and human 
beings during the Age of Kronos, during which ‘no animal was wild or fodder 
for another, and there was no war among them nor any faction at all’ (271e1-2), 
appears to refer directly to Empedocles B130, where, in a description of the 
time during Love’s rule, we are told that animals ‘… were all tame and gen-
tle towards men, both beasts and fowl, and friendly feelings radiated’.18 Kahn 
further suggests that the cycle of reincarnation that takes place in the Age of 
Kronos (when ‘the earthborn kind’ were ‘revived anew there out of those who 
had died and were lying in the earth’; 271a-b) and the ‘fixed periods for rebirths 
at 272d6-e3’ recall the cycles of the transmigration of souls in the Phaedrus, 
both Platonic myths referencing in part the exile and fixed series of reincarna-
tions for the daimōn in Empedocles B115.19 Indeed, the Stranger’s take on the 
mythic trope of autochthonous growth also has an antecedent in Empedocles’ 
account of the generation of men and women from the earth (B62).20 Kahn 
further suggests that we find in the Statesman myth an early formulation of 
Plato’s conception of the cosmos as a living and intelligent animal, which is to 
18   Van Noorden, Playing Hesiod, p. 152; Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, p. 223. In 
specifying that no animal was ‘food’ or ‘meat’ (ἐδωδαί) for another, Plato also echoes here 
Empedocles’ claim that humans did not eat animal flesh during the reign of Love (B128) 
and his injunctions against eating meat in the current age (B136, B137).
19   Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, p. 223. Kahn suggests that both the Platonic 
and Empedoclean cycles of reincarnation must owe something to an older Orphic or 
Pythagorean tradition.
20   Empedocles’ οὐλοφυεῖς τύποι, which ‘did not yet manifest any pleasant figure of limbs’, 
obviously differs from the Stranger’s old, but fully formed, human beings.
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be more fully articulated in the Timaeus.21 Indeed, Empedocles’ own sphairos 
and holy phrēn may be a relevant source of inspiration for such animistic ways 
of thinking about the cosmos.22 Another structural parallel can be found in the 
dynamic of presence and absence at work in each author’s alternating cycles. 
In the Statesman, the cosmos enters the Age of Zeus as soon as the demiurge 
takes his hand off the rudder and ‘withdrew to his lookout point’ (272e); in 
Empedocles, the transition to the state of complete conglomeration takes 
place as Strife is slowly ‘withdrawing to the extremity [of the cosmos]’ (B36).23 
In both cosmologies, the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos in each 
era are determined by this dynamic.
Finally, and most importantly for my argument, the Stranger cites 
Empedocles most directly by forcefully distinguishing his cosmology from 
Empedocles’. In an extended explanation of the reasons why the cosmos must 
participate in cycles of forwards and backwards motion, the Stranger defini-
tively rejects the possibility ‘that some pair of opposite-minded gods turn it’ 
(270a). Unlike the rational-theological arguments employed in dialogues like 
the Euthyphro or Republic, what is being rejected here is not the Homeric 
anthropomorphism which attributes human emotion and war-like conflict to 
the gods. Instead, what is being rejected is specifically the possibility of two 
gods guiding (or ruling) the cosmos in turn in a way that would allow for a 
divergence in thinking between them. The cosmos can only be ruled by the 
unified, single-minded sovereignty of epistēmē. If the cosmos does rotate in 
opposite directions at different times, Plato seems to say, it must be because an 
intelligent ruler is at one time present, at another time absent; it could not be 
because the cosmos admits of differing opinions on the way it should be ruled.
On the one hand, then, we have here a picture of the Statesman myth as 
indebted to Empedocles not just in the structural idea of cosmic cycles, but 
also in the particular characteristics of the cosmos in each age and in the 
minor details and flourishes that the Stranger adds to flesh out his account. 
But on the other hand, we hear the Stranger specifically differentiate his own 
21   Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, p. 223.
22   Compare the cosmos as an animal with φρόνησις at Statesman 269d with Empedocles’ 
φρὴν ἱερή, which flies through the world with swift ‘thoughts’ (φροντίσι) (B134, cp. B27-29). 
For a discussion of the relationship of the sphairos and holy phrēn in these fragments, cf. 
Wright, Empedocles, p. 254.
23   Both authors use similar language to describe the withdrawal of their respective deities: 
compare the various forms of ἵστημι with its different prepositional prefixes in Plato’s εἰς 
τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη (272e) and Empedocles’ οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως / τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν 
ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου (B35 ll. 9-10; cp. ἐξεβεβήκει ln. 11); τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ ἔσχατον 
ἵστατο Νεῖκος (B36).
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cosmology from Empedocles’ by rejecting the possibility of two ‘opposite-
minded’ gods ruling the cosmos in turn. Why does Plato go to such trouble 
to cite Empedocles in this complex way? I suggest that the Stranger’s myth 
aims to persuade us of the fundamental impropriety of rule-by-many, i.e., of 
democratic rule. If (as nearly every Greek theorist would agree) there must be 
a certain symmetry between the structure of the cosmos and the type of ruler-
ship appropriate in the human political sphere, and if the cosmos is structured 
in such a way that specifically precludes the possibility of cosmic rule-by-many, 
then the type of rule called for by our own political situation must necessarily 
be non-democratic. In Section 3 of this paper, I argue that the Stranger demar-
cates the contours of the statesman’s true rule of the city precisely through a 
critique of democratic rule, which has been prepared for his audience by means 
of the mythic critique of Empedocles’ cosmic democracy. Before turning to this 
critique, however, I need to justify the characterization of Empedocles’ cosmos 
as democratically structured.
2 Empedocles’ Cosmic Democracy
Before turning to his texts, it is worth noting that Empedocles’ personal com-
mitment to democracy forms a distinct and often reiterated theme in the 
testamonia.24 While the biographies of philosophers by later Hellenic sources 
are not reliable, these reports give us a valuable glimpse of how a thinker like 
Empedocles was viewed in late antiquity and how his works were interpreted. 
Because I wish to suggest in Section 3 that Plato read Empedocles’ cosmol-
ogy as having a distinctively democratic bent, it is worthwhile to examine this 
24   For a careful treatment of these testamonia, cf. P. S. Horky, ‘Empedocles Democraticus: 
Hellenistic Biography at the Intersection of Philosophy and Politics’, in M. Bonazzi and 
S. Schorn (eds.), Bios Philosophos: Philosophy in Ancient Greek Biography (Turnhout: 
Brepols Publishers, 2016), pp. 37-70. More general assessments regarding Empedocles’ 
political involvements can be found in J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th edn. 
(London: A. & C. Black, 1930), pp. 198-9; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 130-1; Inwood, The Poem 
of Empedocles, pp. 6-8; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical 
History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 
pp. 281-2; G. Naddaf, The Greek Concept of Nature (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2005), p. 140; Wright, Empedocles, pp. 6-9. Horky reserves any final judgement 
about the veracity of the stories. As for the rest of the scholars cited here, Burnet, Inwood, 
and Wright treat the stories with a healthy dose of skepticism, but none find reason to 
doubt the basic claim that Empedocles was a democrat and involved in democratic poli-
tics in Acragas in some substantial way.
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emphasis in the testamonia. Prior to Empedocles’ lifetime, his native Acragas 
and the surrounding poleis in Sicily were ruled by tyrants, including the infa-
mous 6th century tyrant Phalaris of Acragas, who purportedly burned his 
opponents alive in a bronze bull.25 A young Empedocles (who lived roughly 
492-432 BCE) would have witnessed the height of Acragas’ wealth and power 
in Sicily during the reign of the tyrant Theron (who ruled from 488-472 BCE) as 
well as its precipitous decline into political turmoil upon the rule being passed 
to Theron’s son Thrasydaeus.26 Diodorus Siculus reports that Empedocles’s 
father was involved in Thrasydaeus’ overthrow and in the subsequent estab-
lishment of a democracy.27 Upon his father’s death and the stirrings of a new 
tyranny, Empedocles is reported to have ‘persuaded the Agrigentines to put an 
end to their factions and cultivate equality in politics’.28 We have a number of 
other (potentially overlapping) stories concerning Empedocles’ commitment 
to democracy. One such story relates that, during a time of political unrest, 
Empedocles actively persecuted other politicians who planned to become 
tyrants and subvert the democracy.29 Another relates how Empedocles used 
his considerable wealth to break up an anti-democratic organization known as 
‘The Thousand’, presumably an oligarchic conspiracy.30 It is even reported that 
the Agrigentines had offered Empedocles to become their king, which offer 
Empedocles turned down ostensibly because he was a democrat and disagreed 
with monarchy as a form of rule.31 Empedocles’ democratic activities would 
have made him enemies amongst the Agrigentine elite, however, and one of 
the more plausible stories of the philosopher’s death relates that he perished 
in exile after the aristocrats of Acragas plotted against him.32 Regardless of 
whether such stories are factually accurate, these testamonia show that later 
25   Naddaf, The Greek Concept of Nature, p. 140.
26   Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 130-1.
27   Diodorus Siculus (11.23); cf. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 130-1.
28   Diogenes Laertius (8.72). All translations and references to Diogenes Laertius are from 
the Loeb edition: R. D. Hicks, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers vol. II, 
Books 6-10 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925). Diogenes Laertius (8.57), 
Sextus (Against the Professors 7.6), and Quintilian (3.1.8) report that Aristotle claimed 
Empedocles invented rhetoric, and that Gorgias of Leontini was his student. Naddaf and 
Wright both speculate on a connection between Empedocles’ democratic activities 
and his oratorical accomplishments (Naddaf, The Greek Concept of Nature, p. 140; Wright, 
Empedocles, pp. 8-9).
29   Cf. Diogenes Laertius (8.64) for the strange story of Empedocles at dinner with the aspir-
ing tyrants.
30   Diogenes Laertius (8.64); cf. Wright, Empedocles, p. 8.
31   Diogenes Laertius (8.63-4).
32   Diogenes Laertius (8.67); cf. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 131.
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Greeks understood Empedocles’ life and works in a democratic light, and that 
Plato could reasonably have seen him in that light as well.33 Indeed, there 
is evidence that interpreters as early as Aristotle regarded Empedocles as a 
defender of democracy.34
More importantly, though, we find a democratic sympathy reflected in 
the very structure of Empedocles’ cosmos. We have already observed how 
Empedocles describes his cosmic cycles with the language of ‘ruling in turn’. 
In using this language, he draws directly upon the legal terminology of democ-
racy, where the sharing and rotation of offices and magistracies form an 
essential aspect of democratic governance that differentiates it from oligar-
chic or monarchic forms of rule. In Euripides’ Suppliants, for example, Theseus 
challenges the Theban herald when he asks after ‘the master of the land’ (γῆς 
τύραννος) in Athens, stating:
To begin with, stranger, you started your speech on a false note by ask-
ing for the master here. The city is not ruled by a single man but is free 
(ἐλευθέρα πόλις). The people rule, and offices are held by yearly turns 
(δῆμος δ᾿ ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει ἐνιαυσίαισιν): they do not assign the 
highest honors to the rich, but the poor also have an equal share. 
Euripides, Suppliants 403-40835
For Euripides’ Theseus, it is the sharing of offices ‘in turn’ (ἐν μέρει) amongst all 
the dēmos that separates democratic Athens from tyrannical Thebes, making 
Athens ‘a free city’ (ἐλευθέρα πόλις) and ensuring equality amongst the rich 
and poor alike. A passage from Xenophon’s Hellenica likewise illustrates how 
the practice of ‘ruling in turn’ was considered an expression of the democratic 
value of equality. Cephisodotus, appealing to the Athenian audience’s demo-
cratic sentiments, challenges the Spartan ambassador’s proposal regarding the 
division of military and naval control amongst the allies:
‘Answer me’, he said, ‘Timocrates of Lacedaemon, did you not say a 
moment ago that you had come with intent to make the alliance on 
terms of full equality (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις)?’ ‘I did say that’ ‘Then’, said 
33   Note, however, that an exhaustive comparison of the portrayal of Empedocles in these 
testamonia and in Plato’s works would require determining whether and to what extent 
Plato’s conception of democracy might differ from that of the much later Diogenes. 
I thank Carol Atack for this observation.
34   Diogenes Laertius (8.64); cf. Horky, ‘Empedocles Democraticus’, pp. 37-48.
35   Loeb translation: D. Kovacs, Euripides: Suppliant women; Electra; Heracles (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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Cephisodotus, ‘is there anything more equal than that each party in turn 
should be leader of the fleet, and each in turn leader of the army (ἐν μέρει 
μὲν ἑκατέρους ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοῦ πεζοῦ), and that you, if 
there is any advantage in the leadership by sea, should share therein, and 
we likewise in the matter of leadership by land?’ Upon hearing this the 
Athenians were led to change their minds, and they voted that each party 
should hold the leadership in turn for periods of five days. 
Hellenica VII.1.13-1436
When Cephisodotus plays on the Athenian audience’s recognition of ‘equal-
ity’ (ἰσότης) and ‘likeness’ or ‘similar status’ (ὁμοιότης) as fundamental political 
goods, he is able to convince them that the military leadership positions should 
be shared according to a strict rotation of rule, in keeping with democratic 
custom.37 In the Politics, Aristotle identifies the practice of ‘ruling and being 
ruled in turn’ as an essential feature of democracy, insofar as it is the condition 
of possibility for the particular kinds of freedom and equality aimed at by this 
form of rule:
A fundamental principle of the democratic constitution is freedom. (For 
this is what people are accustomed to say, on the ground that only in this 
constitution do they have a share of freedom – which is what they declare 
every democracy aims at.) One component of freedom is ruling and being 
ruled in turn (τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν). For democratic justice is 
having an equal share on the basis of number, not worth … Another is to 
live as one wishes. For this they say is the function of freedom, if indeed 
it is a feature of one who is enslaved not to live as he wishes. This, then, 
is the second mark of democracy; and from it has come the call not to be 
ruled, preferably not by anyone, or failing that, ⟨to rule and be ruled⟩ in 
turn. And in this way the second mark contributes to the freedom based 
on equality. 
Politics VI.2, 1317a40-b1738
36   Loeb translation: C. L. Brownson, Xenophon: Hellenica, vol. II, Books 5-7 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1921).
37   Cp. Aristotle, Politics III.6, 1279a9-10: ‘When the constitution of city-states is based on 
equality and likeness, [the citizens] think that they should rule in turn’ (ὅταν ᾖ κατ’ ἰσότητα 
τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν; my trans.).
38   Clarendon translation: D. Keyt, Aristotle, Politics: Books V and VI (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1999). Angled brackets in translation.
430 Coates
Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 35 (2018) 418-446
The democrat, Aristotle suggests, is really a pragmatic anarchist. The kind of 
freedom the democrat prizes is the freedom of ‘living as one likes’, i.e., the free-
dom not to be beholden to the authority of anyone else. To be ruled by another 
is precisely to live not as one likes, and is tantamount to enslavement. Anarchy 
not being practicable (for reasons left unspecified), the next best option is for 
each citizen to rule and be ruled in turn, for in this way each will have an equal 
share of the rule over all others. Aristotle assumes that it is impossible for all 
to rule over all simultaneously; thus, they do so sequentially, i.e., ‘in turn’. As 
he puts it elsewhere: ‘For it is not possible for all to rule at the same time, but 
each can rule for a year (κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν) or according to some other ordering 
of time’ (Politics II.2, 1261a32-34; my trans.). Presumably this maximizes the 
freedom the democrat wishes to achieve, for over time everyone will subject 
to everyone else; today I live as you like, but tomorrow you will live as I like. 
‘Democratic justice’ is achieved by rotation of office because the share of the 
rule apportioned to each is not based on merit, wealth, or any other criteria 
besides the equal status every man has as free citizen of the polis. The sharing 
and rotation of offices thus follows directly from the ‘fundamental principle’ 
(ὑπόθεσις) of freedom at which democracy aims, and Aristotle concludes that 
this practice is an essential institution of democracy, referring to it as ‘the rul-
ing of all over each, and of each over all in turn’ (τὸ ἄρχειν πάντας μὲν ἑκάστου 
ἕκαστον δ’ ἐν μέρει πάντων) (Politics VI.2, 1317b19-20).39 Indeed, Aristotle’s own 
Constitution of Athens shows that the language of ruling ‘in turn’ formed a vital 
39   For a fuller analysis of Politics VI.2, 1317a40-b17 in context, cf. Keyt, Aristotle, Politics, 
pp. 195-200, which I draw from here. While Aristotle is critical of the ideals of democratic 
freedom and democratic justice as they are articulated in Politics VI.2 (cf. e.g. Politics V.1), 
elsewhere he is sympathetic to the practice of rotation of rule. Amongst people who 
are by nature similar to one another, it is harmful and unjust to have unequal distribu-
tion of the rule; ‘therefore it is just [for each citizen] to rule no more than [he is] ruled, 
and accordingly to do so in turn (ἀνὰ μέρος)’ (Politics III.16, 1287a16-18, my trans. Cp. II.2, 
1261a29-b6). Because it is nearly impossible that human rulers should be equal in virtue 
to gods or divine heroes, it is necessary instead that ‘all should share alike in ruling and 
being ruled in turn’ (ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι) 
(Politics VII.14, 1332b26-27, my trans.). Nevertheless, on the very rare occasion one man is 
so preeminent in virtue that he surpasses all others, it is just that he should be supreme 
ruler over all: he should not ‘be expected to take a turn in being governed’ (οὔτ’ ἀξιοῦν 
ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος), but rather should be sovereign ‘not in turn, but simply’ (μὴ κατὰ 
μέρος…ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς) (Politics IV.17, 1288a15-29, my trans.). The rule of a monarch with super-
lative virtue is preferable in principle to polity: even in the ‘best state’ the sharing of rule 
must be abandoned if someone possessing godlike virtue appears (Politics III.13, 1284b25-
34). For Aristotle, rotation of rule is a practical necessity, not a per se political good. Cf. 
W. R. Newell, ‘Superlative Virtue: The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle’s “Politics”’, The 
Western Political Quarterly, 40, no. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 159-178.
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aspect of 5th-4th century Athenian legal terminology. There Aristotle explains 
that ‘each tribe holds the prutanis in turn (πρυτανεύει δ’ ἐν μέρει τῶν φυλῶν 
ἑκάστη), determined by sortition …’ (Constitution of Athens 43.2), and that sim-
ilarly the Nine Archons (the six thesmothetai, the archon, the basileus, and the 
polemarchos) are elected ‘from each tribe in turn’ (κατὰ μέρος ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς) 
(Constitution of Athens 55.1-2; my trans.). Plato himself viciously criticizes this 
Athenian policy at Statesman 298e-299a, where he describes the offices of rul-
ership as being exchanged ‘annually’ (κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτόν; cp. κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτόν at Politics 
II.2, 1261a33 and ἐν μέρει ἐνιαυσίαισιν at Euripides, Suppliants 407).
The democratic value of a cyclical exchange of power had other expressions 
in Athenian politics besides the rotation of offices and magistracies. Rotation 
of rule appears to be deeply connected to proto-democratic or isonomic jurid-
ical practice and the concomitant development of the concept of isēgoria, 
which, like rotation of rule, is often evoked with the language of ‘taking turns’. 
Such language is used in contexts where a speaker demands equal hearing for 
dissenting opinions: e.g., for the plaintiff and defendant in the courtroom and, 
later, for contrary proposals in the Assembly.40 The importance of equal hear-
ing to early democratic justice is vividly dramatized in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, 
where the testimonies of the gods are treated with equal weight as those of 
mortals, and the disputants in Orestes’ case are consistently represented 
as demanding for themselves (and offering to one another) equal consider-
ation for both sides of the case: i.e., to hear and be heard ‘in turn’ (ἐν μέρει) (cf. 
Eumenides 198-200, 436-42, 585-7; cp. Libation Bearers 332).41 Euripides likewise 
portrays Athenian proto-democratic jurisprudence in terms of equal hearing:
Chorus Leader: Who can decide a plea or judge a speech until he has 
heard a clear statement from both sides? Iolaus: My lord, since this is 
the law in your land [i.e., Athens], I have the right to hear and be heard 
in turn (εἰπεῖν ἀκοῦσαί τ᾿ ἐν μέρει πάρεστί μοι), and no one shall thrust me 
away before I am done, as they have elsewhere. 
Heracleidae 179-8342
40   Demosthenes links democratic freedom and isēgoria with the right to bring forward 
indictments in court (Against Meidias 124). For the development of isēgoria, cf. J. D. Lewis, 
‘Isegoria at Athens: When Did It Begin?’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 20, 
H. 2/3 (2nd Qtr., 1971), pp. 129-40.
41   Aristophanes later parodies the idea of mortals and gods giving heed to one another (and 
thus ruling one another) ‘in turn’ at Birds 1224-29.
42   Loeb translation: D. Kovacs, Euripides: Children of Heracles; Hippolytus; Andromache; 
Hecuba. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Cp. Heracleidae 179-83 with 
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Unlike in tyrannical Mycenae, the refugee Iolaus enjoys a position of authority 
in Athenian court, where the law demands that the Herald, the Chorus Leader, 
and even King Demophon must content themselves to listen in their turn as 
he gives his defense. Invocations of this right appear in 4th century Athenian 
courtroom rhetoric as well: e.g., Demosthenes opens his Against Phormio 
by imploring the jurymen to ‘hear us with goodwill as we speak in our turn’ 
(ἀκοῦσαι ἡμῶν μετ᾿ εὐνοίας ἐν τῷ μέρει λεγόντων) (Against Phormio 1).43
But the Chorus Leader of the Heracleidae also hints at a broader democratic 
importance for equal hearing. Not only is it impossible to judge suits or pleas 
in court (δίκην κρίνειεν) without ‘a clear statement from both sides’, one cannot 
form a judgement about any kind of speech in general (γνοίη λόγον) without it. 
The essential role of speaking in turn for debate in the Assembly is thematized 
in the later oratorical tradition. Both Demosthenes and Aeschines, for example, 
connect proper democratic governance with equal hearing and taking turns. 
In Demosthenes’ Second Olynthiac, the speaker concludes by exhorting the 
Assembly to abandon the factionalism promoted by the symmoriai and ensure 
a proper democratic distribution of power amongst the branches of Athenian 
government (Second Olynthiac 29-31). He implores the audience to ‘become 
yourselves again’ and ‘make common deliberation, speaking, and acting’ (ὑμῶν 
αὐτῶν ἔτι καὶ νῦν γενομένους κοινὸν καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν 
ποιῆσαι), stressing that equitability demands both that all should take part in 
the campaign ‘in turn’ (κατὰ μέρος) and that all those present in the Assembly 
should be given equal opportunity to speak so that the best advice may be 
followed (Second Olynthiac 30-31; my trans.). Aeschines similarly emphasizes 
the vital importance of isēgoria in Against Ctesiphon, beseeching the loud and 
tumultuous Assembly to recall that an orderly exchange of the platform for 
speaking (to bēma) amongst all the citizens is prescribed by the laws, a practice 
which he attributes (perhaps anachronistically) to the inception of Athenian 
democracy in Solon’s reforms (Against Ctesiphon 2). It is only when each citi-
zen, in order of age, can ‘declare his opinion on each topic in his turn’ (ἐν μέρει 
περὶ ἑκάστου γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι) that ‘the city would be best governed’ (πόλις 
ἄριστα διοικεῖσθαι) (Against Ctesiphon 2; my trans.).
Returning to Euripides’ Suppliants, we can now understand why Theseus 
is able to move easily from aligning democratic justice, equality, and freedom 
Hecuba 1129-31. As in the Suppliants, Euripides in the Heracleidae casts Heroic-era Athens 
as a proto-democracy: cf. ll. 34-37, 415-24.
43   Loeb translation: A. T. Murray, Demosthenes: Orations, vol. IV (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1936). Cf. Paley and Sandys’ note on ἐν τῷ μέρει ad loc.: F. A. Paley and 
J. E. Sandys, Select Private Orations of Demosthenes with Introductions and English Notes, 
vol. I (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1874).
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with rotation of office in the passage above (Suppliants 403-8) to aligning these 
same values with the concept of isēgoria just afterwards (ll. 429-41), where he 
sums up thus: ‘Freedom consists in this: “Who has a good proposal and wants 
to set it before the city?”… What is more equal for a city than this?’ (ll. 438-41).44 
The same dynamic of cyclically exchanging authoritative and subordinate 
roles amongst equals is expressed both in rotation of office and in the equal 
hearing of differing opinions in the Assembly. Gathering the threads of these 
various texts together, we see how an equal distribution of power throughout 
the citizenry means not only that offices of rulership are rotated, but also that 
each disputant in their turn may make their case to the jury, and that each citi-
zen in their turn may command the attention of the Assembly, for in this way 
all voices can have equal hearing in the shaping of democratic jurisprudence 
and policy-making. A cyclical exchange of power was thus considered intrinsic 
to the executive, judicial, and legislative functions of democratic governance. 
In a wide variety of texts from the 5th and 4th century, we see this exchange 
signaled by variations on the phrase ‘in turn’.
When Empedocles refers to Love and Strife as ‘ruling in turn’, then, he is 
drawing on a specific Greek political tradition, using the conceptual vocabu-
lary of that tradition to describe the structure of the cosmos. The cosmos is 
organized like a democracy, for the fundamental forces at work there alternate 
cyclically between periods in which one reigns supreme and the other is subor-
dinated and vice versa, just as the citizens in a democratic polis trade off ruling 
and being ruled in turn. At one time, as it were, the cosmos lives as Love likes, 
while at another, it lives as Strife likes.
Indeed, Jaeger has even gone so far to suggest that Empedocles meant to 
include the basic material components of the cosmos as citizens in his cosmic 
democracy. Jaeger sees a tendency in interpretations of Empedocles’ cosmol-
ogy to assume a kind of hierarchy between the divinities of Love and Strife and 
the elements, the former being the sole ruling principles, while the later are 
subordinate to their authority. According to Jaeger, this tendency (begun by 
Aristotle) fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between the con-
stituents of Empedocles’ cosmos.45 Jaeger argues that Love, Strife, and the four 
elements were conceived by Empedocles to be ‘gods of equal rank’. He inter-
prets Empedocles’ cosmology as specifically geared towards attacking Hesiodic 
cosmologies that establish a hierarchy of sovereignty based on the relative pri-
mordiality of gods, where the oldest (πρεσβύτατος) gods are the most honored 
44   I have altered the Loeb translation slightly.
45   W. Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers: The Gifford Lectures 1936 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 140.
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(τιμιώτατος).46 In Empedocles’ cosmology, by contrast, ‘[n]one of these gods 
is more primordial than the others: they are all equal, but each has its own 
ethos, and in the cycle of time each prevails in its turn, in the bodies and lives 
of individual plants, animals, and men, no less than in the life of the cosmos 
itself ’.47 In other words, ‘the aristocratic order of the older theogonic thought 
which was all based on difference of rank, age, and genealogy, is superseded 
[sic] now by the democratic equality of all the elementary and moving forces 
which make up Empedocles’ cosmos’, a view which Jaeger claims is inextrica-
bly linked to Empedocles’ own political commitments.48
Placed as it is in a synoptic treatment of early Greek theology, Jaeger’s anal-
ysis of Empedocles’ cosmology perhaps leaves a little to be desired in terms 
of detailed attention to the texts. The basic thesis of Jaeger’s argument, how-
ever, is firmly supported by a contemporaneous article by Gregory Vlastos. In 
his masterful study ‘Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies’, Vlastos 
argues that early Greek thinkers in the poetic, philosophic, and medical tradi-
tions conceived of the cosmos as structured by ‘cosmic justice’: ‘a conception 
of nature at large as a harmonious association, whose members observe, or 
are compelled to observe, the law of the measure’.49 Vlastos here sets out to 
show that this state of cosmic harmony and justice was understood by these 
46   Jaeger, Theology, p. 139.
47   Jaeger, Theology, p. 138, my emphasis. Jaeger bases his interpretation on a careful exami-
nation of B17, especially ln. 27 and its context, where he argues ταῦτα…πάντα must be 
understood as referring to both Love and Strife and the four elements (Jaeger, Theology, 
pp. 139-140 and his fnn. 42, 48). Graham seems to agree with this conclusion and cites 
Vlastos’ paper in support of the idea that the cosmos pictured by Empedocles is thus to 
be understood as invoking the ‘institutions of participatory democracy, which have mag-
istrates taking turns in office, to illustrate their equality’ (Graham, Early Greek Philosophy, 
p. 425). Wright, on the other hand, argues that ταῦτα…πάντα must refer to the elements 
alone (Wright, Empedocles, pp. 170-1), and Vlastos himself seems to assume as a matter of 
course that ln. 27 discusses only the elements (G. Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 159 and 
fn. 29). It does not seem to me that this particular line can be definitively read either way. 
However, a thorough appreciation of Empedocles’ commitment to cosmic democracy in 
some other fragments certainly complicates any simplistic view of Love and Strife as sov-
ereign rulers over the elements, and lends credence to Jaeger’s interpretation.
48   Jaeger, Theology, p. 140. For the purposes of my argument, it is inconsequential whether 
Jaeger is ultimately correct about the equiprimordiality of and equality between Love, 
Strife, and the elements. Nor is it necessary for my argument to describe in overly precise 
terms the cosmic-political relationship between Love and Strife and the elements (indeed, 
it seems doubtful even whether Empedocles did so in his texts). All that is necessary 
for my point here is that we recognize that Empedocles describes both the relationship 
between Love and Strife and the relationship amongst the elements in the essentially 
democratic terms of ‘ruling in turn’.
49   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 156.
435Cosmic Democracy or Cosmic Monarchy?
Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 35 (2018) 418-446
thinkers primarily in terms of equality: ‘Cosmic equality was conceived as the 
guaranty [sic] of cosmic justice: the order of nature is maintained because it is 
an order of equals’.50 Empedocles provides for Vlastos an entry point for con-
sidering this way of thinking in the philosophic tradition. Vlastos emphasizes 
here several aspects of Empedocles’ cosmos already mentioned, including the 
equality of the elements (B17 ll. 27, 35) and the fact that both Love and Strife 
and the elements are thought of as ‘ruling in turn’.51 Similarly to Jaeger, Vlastos 
observes that the thoroughgoing equality amongst the constituent aspects of 
the cosmos implies that ‘the universe cannot be a ‘monarchy’, for no power 
within it possesses the qualifying primogeniture’; instead, the cosmos ‘must 
be an isonomia, for it conforms to the democratic principle of rotation of 
office’.52 Vlastos supports these conclusions with a close reading of fragment 
B30, where he finds cosmic justice being described in essentially democratic 
terms.53 While I agree with Vlastos’ reading of the fragment, I would like to 
probe a little deeper here and show just how much Empedocles relies on the 
conceptual vocabulary of democracy in B30 and the related B115 for his analy-
sis of the political structure of the cosmos.
B30 reads as follows:
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα Νεῖκος ἐνὶμμελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη
ἐς τιμάς τ’ ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο,
ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ’ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου…
But when great Strife was nourished in its limbs,
It leapt up to its office as the time for exchange was being fulfilled
Which had been marked out for them [i.e., Love and Strife] by a broad 
oath … (my trans.)
This fragment should be compared with the first two lines of B115, which con-
cerns the exile of a criminal daimōn:
ἔστιν Ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,
ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις·…
50   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 156. Emphasis in original.
51   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 159.
52   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 160.
53   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 160-1.
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There is an oracle of necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
Eternal, sealed up with broad oaths … (my trans.)
These lines establish the authority of a cosmic justice that requires the 
punishments for the murdering daimōn, namely, the exile and the cycle of 
reincarnations that are described in the remaining lines of the fragment.
We should dwell here on the vivid political images Empedocles deploys 
to describe the structure of the cosmos. In B30, Strife leaps up54 to its ‘pre-
rogative’, ‘established right’, or ‘office’ (τιμή). The image is of an orderly legal 
transaction at an established time for exchange of power.55 Strife does not 
seize power in an illegal coup, but rather takes over what is its αἶσα, its due 
share of the rule.56 This legal exchange of power is ratified by a ‘broad oath’.57 
Vlastos notes that the ‘broad oaths’ of B115 ‘represent the binding, inviolate, 
necessary character of that decree [i.e., the θεῶν ψήφισμα], which is an ‘oracle 
of Anankē’.58 Connecting this with the close relationship of Anankē and Dikē 
in Parmenides’ poem, Vlastos interprets these ‘broad oaths’ in B30 and B115 
as ‘allud[ing] to the orderliness of existence conceived under the aspect of 
justice’.59 The primary function of the image of ‘broad oaths’ is thus to indicate 
54   Both Garani and Wright hear violent undertones to the verb ἀνόρουσε (M. Garani, 
‘Cosmological Oaths in Empedocles and Lucretius’, in A. H. Sommerstein and J. Fletcher 
(eds.), Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2007), pp. 189-202, 
264-67, p. 194 fn. 26; Wright, Empedocles, p. 191). None of the citations listed in the LSJ for 
the verb ἀνορούω have necessarily violent contexts, though, and Garani herself interprets 
the fragment to mean that Love and Strife ‘agree voluntarily as equals to undertake the 
duty of ruling successively within the world’ (Garani, ‘Cosmological Oaths’, p. 191).
55   Garani, ‘Cosmological Oaths’, p. 191; Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 161.
56   B26 ln. 2: ἐν μέρει αἴσης; cf. Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 161 and his fn. 47.
57   Wright suggests that it is not particularly important to identify who is swearing the oath 
(Wright, Empedocles, p. 191), but it seems to make the most sense to assume it is ‘sworn’ by 
Love and Strife.
58   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 160; emphasis in original.
59   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 160-1 and his fn. 43. Garani rightly corrects the tradition of 
interpretation, beginning with Simplicius, that simply equates these two usages of ὅρκος 
with ἀνάγκη. This tradition ignores the important difference between the first instance 
(guaranteeing the mutual succession of Love and Strife) which is inviolable, and the sec-
ond instance which deals precisely with a ὅρκος that is transgressed by a daimōn (Garani, 
‘Cosmological Oaths’, p. 193). Nevertheless, Garani acknowledges that the repetition of 
the ‘broad oath’ points to an important connection between the cosmic and daemonic 
cycle. More importantly for our purposes, she concludes that even if the cycle of the 
mutual succession of Love and Strife are not to be thought of as determined by ἀνάγκη, 
the function of the ‘metaphor’ of the ὅρκος in B30 is ‘to maintain within [Empedocles’] 
system the dualism between Love and Strife and the equal status that he tries to accord 
with them and to block any impression that both might be jointly subject to a higher 
authority’ (Garani, ‘Cosmological Oaths’, p 194).
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the ‘equalitarian justice of rotation of office’ that forms the fundamental struc-
ture of the cosmos.60
Beyond the repetition of the ‘broad oath’ from B30, the first two lines of 
B115 are rife with the conceptual vocabulary of democracy as well. In regard to 
the θεῶν ψήφισμα of ln. 1, ψήφισμα can mean ‘generally, decree, law’ (LSJ A. II., 
where B115 ln. 1 is listed as one instance of this general meaning). The more 
common meaning, however, is a ‘proposal passed by a majority of votes: esp. 
measure passed by a popular assembly, decree, act’ (LSJ A.). Thus Empedocles 
represents his divinities here as ‘voting to accept and swearing to abide by 
what must inevitably happen’.61 The participle κατεσφρηγισμένον in B115 ln. 2 
is from κατασφραγίζω (‘to seal up’ or ‘secure’), an interesting verb that is not 
well-attested prior to the end of the 5th century BCE. The few texts from this 
period in which it appears, however, illustrate that the verb has powerful con-
notations in the context of Greek democracy. In Isocrates’ Trapeziticus, for 
instance, the accuser indicts the banker Pasion’s friend Pythodorus for tamper-
ing with the voting-urns (τὰς ὑδρίας) containing the names of those nominated 
to judge the dramatic contests at the Dionysian festival. The accuser claims that 
Pythodorus opened the urns secretly, which ‘were stamped (σεσημασμέναι) by 
the Prytanes and sealed up (κατεσφραγισμέναι) by the Choregi …’ (Trapeziticus 
17.34 ll. 3-4; my trans.) and guarded by the treasurers on the Acropolis. The act 
of stamping (σημαίνομαι) and sealing up (κατασφραγίζω) the voting urns serves 
to ratify the impartiality of the democratic selection of judges for the con-
tests; hence tampering with the seals of the urns threatens the legitimacy of 
the democratic process itself. Apparently the process of stamping and sealing 
up went hand-in-hand as a common form of ratification, so much so that the 
author of the Suda sees them as nearly equivalent. Cf. Suda s.v. Συσσημαίνεσθαι:
That which they call ‘to seal up’ (κατασφραγίσασθαι), this the orators 
refer to as ‘to join in stamping’ (συσσημαίνεσθαι). Lycurgus in his ‘On the 
Priestess’: ‘So that is has been ordered by majority vote (ἐπὶ ψηφίσματος) 
that the priestess must join in stamping (συσσημαίνεσθαι) the documents’. 
(My trans.)
Suda 1675
In the Lycurgus fragment attested in this entry, the process of stamping official 
documents is ordered by the ψήφισμα, the majority vote. When the priestess 
joins in stamping the documents, she ratifies this majority vote and gives her 
assent to the decision of the democratic process. The fragment thus illustrates 
60   Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice’, p. 161.
61   Wright, Empedocles, p. 272; cp. Garani, ‘Cosmological Oaths’, p. 192.
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the reciprocal power relations that form the basis for democratic governance: 
on the one hand, the priestess is required by the majority vote to stamp the 
documents, on the other, that vote itself is only authorized and made officially 
valid once the priestess has joined in stamping the official documents.
A fruitful comparison can be made between the function of this semantic 
complex in Empedocles’ fragments and in Aeschylus’ Suppliants.62 The con-
cept of the ψήφισμα (and the closely related ψῆφος) play an integral role in the 
action of the play, where King Pelasgus cannot immediately grant the Chorus 
of the Danaides admittance to Argos without first putting the question to a 
vote amongst the people at large.63 From the moment the Chorus receives the 
news of the ψηφίσματα from their father Danaus (cf. ll. 600-1; also referred to 
as the ‘people’s sovereign vote’ [δήμου κρατοῦσα χείρ] in ln. 604),64 the action 
62   C. J. Herington has argued that Aeschylus visited Sicily during Empedocles’ lifetime, and 
that his plays were performed there (C. J. Herington, ‘Aeschylus in Sicily’, The Journal of 
Hellenic Studies, 87 (1967), pp. 74-85). Herington elsewhere collects much evidence for 
the mutual influence of the poet and the philosopher on one another (C. J. Herington, ‘A 
Study in the ‘Prometheia’, Part I: The Elements in the Trilogy’, Phoenix 17.3 (1963), pp. 180-
197, pp. 192-7), even going so far as to suggest that fragment 44 of Aeschylus’ Danaides 
(the third part of the Suppliants’ tetralogy) may be a near quote from some lost part of 
Empedocles’ poems (Herington, ‘A Study in the ‘Prometheia’ ’, p. 195 fn. 55; cf. Herington, 
‘Aeschylus’, p. 81). Herington likens fragment 44 to Empedocles B71-73. The Aeschylus 
fragment is certainly remarkably similar to Empedocles’ poem in its representation of 
Aphrodite as more a cosmic attractive and procreative force than as an anthropomor-
phized, personified deity, and we should compare the very similar hymn to Venus in 
Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura Book I, ll. 1-43 (a passage that is widely accepted as dem-
onstrating the influence of Empedocles’ cosmology on Lucretius). While Herington’s 
argument for mutual intellectual influence between Empedocles and Aeschylus focuses 
mainly on similarities he finds in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the common democratic 
language employed in B115 and Aeschylus’ Suppliants may support Herington’s findings 
from a different vantage.
63   Suppliants 365-401 showcase the dramatic political tension between rule-of-one and rule-
of-many at the heart of the play. After Pelasgus’ claim that he ‘cannot make a binding 
promise (ὑπόσχεσις; cp. ὅρκος) beforehand, but only after making this matter known to 
the whole citizen body’, the Chorus replies: ‘You are the city, I tell you, you are the people! 
A head of state, not subject to judgement, you control the altar, the hearth of the city, by 
your vote and nod alone (μονοψήφοισι νεύμασιν σέθεν); with your sceptre alone, on your 
throne, you determine every matter’ (emphasis in translation). Pelasgus shows a single-
minded commitment to the priority of democratic rule over his own sovereignty: ‘I have 
already said I am not prepared to do this without the people’s approval, even though 
I have the power …’ (cf. ll. 397-401). All translations and line number references from 
Aeschylus’ Suppliants are from the Loeb edition: A. H. Sommerstein, Aeschylus vol. I: 
Persians, Seven Against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008).
64   Cp. ll. 698-700: ‘And may the people, which rules the city, (τὸ δάμιον, τὸ πτόλιν κρατύνει) 
protect well the citizens’ privileges, a government acting with craft and foresight for the 
common good …’
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of the play accelerates quickly towards its climax, when Pelasgus informs 
the herald of the Egyptian cousins that the people of Argos have approved the 
Chorus’ supplication:
That is the unanimous vote (ψῆφος; cp. ll. 640, 644, 963-5) that has been 
passed and enacted by the people (δημόπρακτος) of the city, never to sur-
render this band of women by force. This decision has been nailed down 
with a nail that has pierced right through, so that it stays fixed. These 
words are not written on tablets, nor sealed up (κατεσφραγισμένα) in a 
folded sheet of papyrus: you hear them plainly from the lips and tongue 
of a free man. 
Aeschylus, Suppliants 943-949
Here again the verb κατασφραγίζω appears in the context of the democratic 
decision-making process. Ordinarily, Pelasgus implies, the ψῆφος would be 
‘sealed up’ in written law, ratifying the people’s decision and codifying it perma-
nently (just as how the priestess must ‘join in stamping’ the official documents 
in the Lycurgus fragment). In the context of the action of the play, however, the 
democratic decision of the people need not be immediately sealed up in writ-
ten law precisely because there is a king who puts the force of his rule behind 
it. In the Empedocles fragment, by contrast, the ψήφισμα of the gods must be 
sealed up with broad oaths precisely because there is no such cosmic king who 
could enforce the decree solely with the power of his living voice.
We can thus see how the conceptual vocabulary that Empedocles mobilizes 
to describe the structure of the cosmos has a thoroughly democratic context. 
From the power dynamic between Love and Strife in B17 and B30, to the cos-
mic justice described in B115, to the way in which the elements also ‘rule in 
turn’ in B26, we see Empedocles again and again portraying the cosmos to be 
essentially structured as a democracy, where shared rule between constituents 
and the cosmic justice this implies are eternally assured through mutually 
sworn oaths and ratified by divine ‘vote’. These political aspects of Empedocles’ 
cosmos manifest as part of a broader Greek intellectual tradition, the central 
feature of which is (as Jaeger puts it) ‘the interpretation of natural processes by 
means of analogies taken from man’s political and social life’.65 Part and parcel 
of this tradition, though, was an appreciation of the normative implications 
that such interpretations carried. Jaeger again explains: ‘the relationship of the 
social element in Greek thought to the cosmological was always a reciprocal 
one: as the universe was understood in terms of political ideas such as diké, 
65   Jaeger, Theology, p. 139.
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nomos, moira, kosmos, equality, so the political structure was derived through-
out from the eternal order of the cosmos’.66 Did Empedocles see his own 
cosmology as having direct implications for human politics? We cannot be 
certain that he did on the basis of the extant fragments alone, although the tes-
tamonia make it clear that later Greek authors certainly interpreted his work 
in that way. Plato, immersed as he was in the democratic milieu of 5th-4th cen-
tury Athens, would have immediately recognized the democratic resonance of 
phrases like en merei kratein and the corollary concept of ‘taking turns’; indeed, 
he criticizes this Athenian practice in the Statesman. The very fact that Plato 
consistently alludes to various aspects of Empedocles’ cosmology in a context 
where he himself is explicitly concerned with the relation between cosmic 
structure and human politics suggests that Plato understands Empedocles’ 
cosmology as also having definite political implications. This insight is key to 
understanding the myth of the Statesman and its function in the argument of 
the dialogue. There the myth of the two ages serves as a foil to Empedocles’ 
cosmic democracy and the Stranger appears as an anti-democratic champion 
of both human and cosmic epistemic monarchy.
3 Plato’s Rejection of Cosmic and Human Democracies in the 
Statesman
In S. S. Monoson’s monograph entitled Plato’s Democratic Entanglements: 
Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy, the author provides an 
extended argument against the ‘canonical’ portrayal of Plato as a ‘virulent 
antidemocrat’.67 In Monoson’s view, Plato’s engagement with democracy as a 
form of rule is never a simple rejection, but rather a synthesis of repudiations 
of particular democratic practices and tendencies with appropriations of cer-
tain democratic values, all set within the context of Plato’s own complicated 
relationship with Athenian democracy. While Monoson provides interesting 
analysis of many of Plato’s dialogues and of the (pseudo-Platonic?) letters 
alongside the texts of other contemporary political theorists, orators, and his-
torians, an extended examination of Plato’s Statesman is conspicuously absent 
from her work. In a nearly 250 page book, about two and a half of these pages 
are dedicated to the Statesman. Monoson interprets Plato as claiming there 
66   Jaeger, Theology, p. 140. Garani makes a similar point (Garani, ‘Cosmological Oaths’, 
p. 195).
67   S. S. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of 
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 3.
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that democracy is the ‘best’ of the ‘likely-to-exist, flesh-and-blood regimes’, 
which she also calls the ‘imperfect, actually existing regimes’.68 Monoson sug-
gests the Stranger’s claim that democracies are ‘least capable of perpetrating 
great evil’ means that they afford the ‘best protection against tyranny’.69 Plato’s 
critique in this discussion, Monoson claims, is leveled against the Athenians’ 
obsession with their own legalism, which Plato implies is no real legal code at 
all.70 In this way, it seems to Monoson, Plato intertwines a moderate endorse-
ment of democracy as a form of rule with a critique of the actually existing 
legal codes of Greek democratic states. For Monoson, we see in the Statesman 
‘Plato’s appreciation of the difficulty of passing a final, single judgement on so 
complex a phenomenon as democratic government and ways of life’.71
Monoson assumes in this treatment that the only three forms of regime 
which Plato envisages as ‘likely-to-exist’ are the three lawless versions of democ-
racy, oligarchy, and tyranny; in this light, democracy is the ‘best’ form of rule 
pragmatically possible.72 Monoson misinterprets the passage in question (i.e., 
302b-303d).73 On a more fundamental level, however, Monoson misses the 
thorough-going rejection of democracy that Plato has woven into the fabric of 
the dialogue from the very beginning. The grounding assumption of the con-
versation between the Stranger and Young Socrates is that statesmanship is 
68   Monoson, Democratic Entanglements, pp. 120-1.
69   Monoson, Democratic Entanglements, pp. 120-1.
70   Monoson, Democratic Entanglements, p. 122.
71   Monoson, Democratic Entanglements, p. 122.
72   Monoson, Democratic Entanglements, p. 121.
73   There are good reasons to wonder whether or not Plato believes the rule of the true 
statesman (one who possesses the ‘kingly science’) is a real pragmatic possibility: this 
‘seventh’ form of rule, the Stranger says, is to be distinguished from the other six degener-
ate regimes ‘as a god from men’ (303b), which we might compare to Socrates’ description 
of the ideal city in the Republic as a ‘model laid up in heaven’ (Republic 592b). Kahn gives 
a convincing argument that Plato did in fact consider the true statesman to be only an 
ideal possibility, of which the remaining, actual forms of government are just better or 
worse imitations (Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, pp. 231-5). However, contra 
Monoson, there is no indication in the text that we are meant to think of legal monarchy, 
aristocracy, and legal democracy as ‘ideal’ in this way. On the contrary, the ruling party in 
all six forms of lesser regimes are grouped together in distinction from the true statesman 
‘… on the grounds that they are not statesmen but faction-makers’, ‘imitators’, ‘wizards’, 
and ‘the greatest sophists among the sophists’ (303b-c). Indeed, the whole question of 
which among the ‘incorrect regimes’ (which includes again all six) are least and most 
difficult to live in presumes that they are all basically comparable as real pragmatic pos-
sibilities (cf. 302b-303b). Amongst these six possible forms of government, the two forms 
of democracy are cast precisely as a ‘mean’ or midpoint on the scale of best to worse 
regimes: legal democracy is the worst of the three legal (i.e., ‘good’) regimes, and lawless 
democracy is the least bad of the three lawless regimes (303a-b).
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an epistēmē and that the statesman is ‘one among those who are knowledge-
able’ (τῶν ἐπιστημόνων) (258b; cf. 292b). This assumption is never questioned, 
always providing the touchstone in their search for the true statesman. But the 
constantly reiterated correlate to this claim is that of the essential illegitimacy 
of non-monarchic forms of rule, and especially of democratic rule. The only 
criterion for legitimacy of rulership that the Stranger will accept is the pos-
session of kingly epistēmē (292c), and three times he insists that a multitude 
of people could never obtain the art of political rule, which is always the pur-
view of just one or some very few persons (292e-293a, 297b-c, 300e). While the 
Stranger does make analogies between the political art and the other kinds of 
specialized arts in the cities (which are also only ever possessed by the very 
few), the basic claims that statesmanship is an epistēmē and that democratic 
rule is inappropriate in principle are never argued for explicitly. This is surpris-
ing given the lengthy critique of specific Athenian democratic practices in the 
latter half of the dialogue (298a-300b). Indeed, the Stranger presents for us 
a fuller picture of life in a democracy than he does of life under the reign of 
the true statesman, whose rule is described only in its essential act of weaving 
together moderate and courageous characters, and not at all in the particu-
larities of the social structure present in this regime.74 Given the paramount 
importance of this claim about political epistēmē and its possession by a one or 
few but never many, why does it seem the Stranger omits any explicit justifica-
tion for it?
I suggest that the myth of the two ages offers a specific kind of support for 
the Stranger’s prioritization of epistemic monarchy over other possible forms 
of rule. This support is persuasive rather than strictly argumentative, however, 
for the Stranger opts to set aside his dialectic with Young Socrates and to pres-
ent his interlocutor (and we the readers) with a myth instead, one that he 
characterizes as a playful image and likeness (268d-e), yet also as one which 
has real causal-explanatory power and is especially fitting for the ‘showing 
forth of the king’ (269b-c). Just as Homer, Hesiod, and the Presocratic cosmolo-
gists had used mythic-poetic discourse to make broader claims about the gods, 
the cosmos, and the sources of legitimate human authority, so the Stranger will 
deploy his own myth for the sake of persuading Young Socrates (and Plato’s 
audience) regarding certain first principles of political cosmology. The myth 
operates as persuasive support for the Stranger’s argument on two related 
registers: first, it establishes his cosmic monarchy precisely in and through its 
74   We might compare, for instance, the lengthy descriptions of what kind of social structure 
is necessary for the true statesmanship of philosopher kings and queens to arise in the 
ideal city of the Republic.
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rejection of Empedocles’ cosmic democracy; second, it establishes the neces-
sarily mimetic relationship between our own political situation and the rule of 
the demiurge in the age of Kronos.
Section 1 of this paper has shown not only that the Stranger refers to 
Empedocles throughout his myth, but that the basic structure of the mythic 
cosmology described there is lifted directly from Empedocles’ poem. When 
the Stranger insists then that the alternations in direction of rotation of the 
cosmos could never be due to the fact that ‘some pair of opposite-minded 
gods turn it’ (270a), the Stranger explicitly rejects the democratic foundation 
of Empedocles’ cosmic cycles, in which the deities of Love and Strife cyclically 
exchange their offices and ‘rule in turn’. The Stranger emphasizes the impro-
priety of democratic ‘ruling in turn’ in his description of the transition from 
the Age of Kronos to the Age of Zeus. The Age of Kronos is a time in which the 
demiurge rules the cosmos and its rotation (271d). When we enter the Age of 
Zeus, the god withdraws from the cosmos and his rule is, in a sense, passed off 
to the cosmos itself. After the cosmos reversed itself, it ‘entered in an orderly 
way into its habitual course, itself exercising both care and control (ἐπιμέλειαν 
καὶ κράτος) over the things within itself and over itself, and remembering the 
teaching of its craftsman and father as best it could’ (273a-b). Later, we are told 
that ‘it was prescribed for the cosmos to be the self-ruler of its own passage’ 
(αὐτοκράτορα…τῆς αὑτοῦ πορείας) during the Age of Zeus (274a). In describing 
the Age of Zeus as a time in which the cosmos ‘rules’ itself, the Stranger again 
invites a comparison with Empedocles’ rotations of office between Love and 
Strife: in a sense, the demiurge and then the cosmos itself rule the cosmos ‘in 
turn’. Strictly speaking, however, the cosmos’ self-rule is really no rule at all: it 
is the state of absence of true rule. The cosmos’ self-rule is only the memory of 
the demiurge’s true rule, which is inevitably forgotten as time goes by (273a-e). 
Without being grounded in the skill or art that the god possesses (which is 
implied by the very name δημιουργός, a ‘skilled workman’, as well as by the 
specific metaphors of shepherd, herdsman, and pilot) eventually ‘the cosmos 
itself possesses and produces among the animals everything under the heav-
ens that turns out to be harsh and unjust’, i.e., the opposite of real governance 
(273b-c). One might thus pose the situation in the following way: lacking the 
true epistēmē of the demiurge, the cosmos must rely on its increasingly faulty 
memory of his epistēmē, a memory which can never fully replicate this perfect 
rule and care but can only ever misrepresent the content of that epistēmē to a 
lesser or a greater degree. When the Stranger echoes Empedocles’ idea of rul-
ing the cosmos in turn in this way, he is thus also simultaneously ‘correcting’ 
that idea. If there were to be such cosmic cycles as Empedocles imagines, the 
Stranger seems to say, they could only ever be cycles of presence and absence 
444 Coates
Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 35 (2018) 418-446
of a single epistemic monarch, never the cycles of rotation in office proper to 
a democracy of equals. We can thus see here how Empedocles’ cosmology is 
cited by the Stranger only to be rejected, not through an argumentative logos 
but through a persuasive, richly-textured muthos designed to rival Empedocles’ 
own poetic imagination.
Finally, we need to briefly examine how the Stranger establishes the mimetic 
relation between the demiurgic rule in the Age of Kronos and the human polit-
ical sphere. While it is never explicitly stated in the Statesman that human 
rulership should imitate the rule of the demiurge in the Age of Kronos, this 
idea is part and parcel of the logic of imitation at work in the myth of the 
two ages, and is confirmed by a passage from the Laws. As we have just noted, 
during the Age of Zeus the cosmos as a whole has an imitative relation to the 
rulership during the Age of Kronos through its memory of the ‘teaching’ of 
the demiurge (who has of course ‘taught’ only by immediate example, i.e., 
by offering a model for imitation) (273a-b). As a correlate to this imitation of 
demiurgic rule by the cosmos, the Stranger suggests that all the constituent 
parts of the cosmos, including human beings, imitate the condition of the cos-
mos itself during the Age of Zeus (i.e., they imitate its backwards-turning and 
lack of guidance from the god, which results in all the associated characteris-
tics of the age) (273e-274a). For human beings, ‘imitating and following along 
with the condition of the all’ (ἀπομιμούμενα καὶ συνακολουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ παντὸς 
παθήματι) (274a) in this way entails ageing in the opposite direction, reproduc-
ing sexually rather than being born autochthonously, and becoming exposed 
to a dangerous, hostile world, which exposure directly entails the need for poli-
tics (274a-c). In the Age of Zeus, human beings have become, like the cosmos, 
αὐτοκράτωρ, or ‘self-ruling’: ‘… the condition of care from the gods had given 
out, and humans themselves needed to take hold of the course of their lives 
and its care on their own, just like the whole cosmos, with which we, imitat-
ing and following along with it (συμμιμούμενοι καὶ συνεπόμενοι), through time 
everlasting, live and grow now in this way, now in that’ (274d-e). Συμμιμέομαι 
means not simply to imitate, but to ‘join in imitating’ (LSJ A.).75 Human beings 
do not just imitate the condition of the cosmos; we also join with the cosmos in 
imitating the demiurgic rule as much as is possible in our own attempts at self-
rule. Because the cosmos imitates the demiurge in its own self-rule, and we 
imitate the cosmos in our own self-rule, when we attempt to govern ourselves 
we actually join the cosmos in imitating the demiurge; i.e., we try to ‘remember’ 
75   Cp. the word συμμιμητής in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians 3.17: ‘Be joint imitators of me, 
brothers, and behold those who walk around in this way, even as you have us as a model 
(τύπον)’ (my trans.).
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his rule, just as the cosmos does.76 In this way, both the cosmos as a whole and 
human beings in particular imitate the demiurge in their attempts at self-rule. 
Evidence confirming this interpretation can be found in a passage from Laws 
IV (713b-714a).77 Here the Athenian also invokes the Age of Kronos as a ‘Golden 
Age’ of plenty and prosperity, where the god sets the lesser divinities as rul-
ers over human beings precisely because we cannot be properly ‘self-ruling’ 
(αὐτοκράτωρ). On account of this deficiency, the best human governments can 
achieve is a mere imitation of the rule which establishes order in the Age of 
Kronos: ‘… it is said that in the time of Kronos there was a very happy rule and 
way of living, of which the best of current governments possesses an imita-
tion (μίμημα)’ (Laws IV 713b; my trans.). The lesson of the myth, the Athenian 
explains, is that ‘it is necessary for us to imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) in every way pos-
sible the life said to have been led under Kronos …’ (Laws IV 713e; my trans.).
Now we are in a position to fully appreciate how the myth undergirds the 
overall political argument of the Statesman. If the cosmos is structured not 
as an Empedoclean democracy but as a monarchy, and if human governance 
should mimetically reflect this rule, then the best human regime is neces-
sarily an epistemic monarchy or as close of an approximation to this as is 
practically possible. We have seen how Empedocles could stand for Plato as 
an exemplar of the popular Greek trope which envisions a macro-micro level 
similarity between cosmos and polis as well as the normative and political 
implications that this relationship carries. In the Statesman, Plato appropri-
ates Empedocles’ cosmic cycles while rejecting their democratic valence, 
‘improving’ them by replacing Empedocles’ democratic rotation of rule with 
his own cycles of the presence and absence of a supreme cosmic monarch. 
Playing on the Greek cosmological-political trope by replacing Empedocles’ 
cosmic democracy with his own version of a mythical cosmic monarchy, Plato 
suggests a kind of mythic ‘argument’: (1) In a previous age, the cosmos was 
ruled by a monarch possessing epistēmē (not by equal constituents in a cosmic 
democracy); (2) In our current age, the correct form of human political rule 
76   An important caveat: proper human imitation of the demiurge does not imply becoming 
a ‘shepherd’ in the way the demiurge is our shepherd in the Age of Kronos. Assuming a 
human being could be a ‘shepherd’ in a way analogous to the demiurge is precisely the 
‘great error’ the myth is ostensibly designed to correct (cf. 274e-275a). Proper imitation of 
the demiurge would be rather enacting the right kind of ‘tending’ or ‘caring’ of the human 
flock which is possible by one human being over others. This is still imitation of the demi-
urgic rule, though, for it acts precisely as a prosthetic for the care that would otherwise 
have been provided by the gods in the Age of Kronos.
77   Cf. Kahn’s interpretation of the passage: Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 
pp. 233-4.
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should imitate that absent rule; (3) Therefore, the correct form of human polit-
ical rule is rule by a monarch possessing epistēmē (not by equal constituents in 
a human democracy).78 Thus, it is precisely Plato’s simultaneous appropriation 
and rejection of Empedocles’ political cosmology that supports the adoption 
of sovereign epistēmē as the basic criterion in the search for the statesman, 
an epistēmē that could never be the possession of a democratic hoi polloi. The 
logic of this ‘argument’ is readily available to Plato, for it is simply a repetition 
of the well-established cosmo-political symmetry that Empedocles and many 
others envision. What is needed to ‘correct’ the tradition that conceives this 
symmetry in terms of equalitarian politics is precisely a new mythic discourse 
with which to understand the place of the human being in the cosmos. And 
this is precisely what the Stranger offers us in the myth of the two ages.
In a final pièce de résistance, the Stranger suggests at the very closing of the 
Statesman that, upon completing the ‘smooth and well-woven web’ of moder-
ate and courageous souls in the city, the culminating act of statecraft will be 
‘always to turn over to them in common the offices in the city’ (310e-311a). We 
see here a last blow against cosmic and human democracies, for the Stranger 
argues that a genuine sharing of offices and of rule in the city is only possible 
under the epistemic monarchy of the true statesman. A sign of the polis’ tightly 
woven social fabric, this best city will be one in which the offices of rulership 
are shared alike amongst moderate and courageous souls, but always under 
the watchful eye of the monarch who possesses kingly epistēmē (311a). Far from 
showing us Plato’s ambiguous relationship to rule of the many, the Statesman 
thus exhibits the staunchest rejection of the appropriateness of democracy for 
our own political situation and for the cosmos as a whole.79
78   Posed in this way, we can see why Kahn is drawn to describing the myth as functioning 
like a ‘premise’ in the argument of the dialogue.
79   I am deeply indebted to Sean D. Kirkland and Michael Naas for their comments on early 
drafts of this paper, as well as to two anonymous referees for their extensive suggestions 
throughout.
